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We know a great deal about schizophrenia, but the current state of the art is one of
uncertainty. Researchers are confused, and patients feel misunderstood. This situation
has been identified as due largely to the fact that the dominant neurobiological
perspective leaves out the person. The aim of the present article is to review and
integrate a series of clinical, phenomenological, historical, cultural, epidemiological,
developmental, epigenetic, and therapeutic phenomena in support of a suggestion that
schizophrenia is above all a disorder of the person rather than of the brain. Specifically,
we review seven phenomena, beginning with the conception of schizophrenia as a
particular disorder of the self. We continue by looking at its recent origin, as a modern
phenomenon, its juvenile onset, related to the formation of the self, the better prognosis
in developing countries compared to developed countries, and the high incidence of the
disorder among migrants. In the context of these phenomena of a marked socio-cultural
nature, we consider the so-called “genetic myth,” according to which schizophrenia
would have a genetic origin. On reviewing the current genetic emphasis in the light of
epigenetics, it emerges that the environment and behavior recover their prominent role
in the vicissitudes of development. The seventh reason, which closes the circle of the
argument, concerns the role of interpersonal “chemistry” in recovery of the sense of self.
Keywords: ipseity-disturbance model, self-disorder, schizophrenia, hyperreflexivity, disociation
We know many facts about schizophrenia, but in the end, we do not know what it is (Keshavan
et al., 2011). Commenting on Keshavan et al. (2011). Mario Maj highlights the disenchantment
and skepticism found today among clinicians and in the general population about the possibility of
attaining a robust understanding of the pathophysiology of schizophrenia in the near future, despite
so many “facts.” “The huge mass of ‘data’ or ‘evidence’ which is being accumulated in this area,” says
Maj, “is not perceived anymore as an indication of a continuing increase of ‘knowledge.’ Rather, this
mass of data is increasingly seen as a sign of uncertainty and confusion.” (Maj, 2011, p. 20).
As recognized by Keshavan and colleagues, the current concept of schizophrenia lacks validity,
despite its diagnostic reliability. The lack of validity of the schizophrenia concept is “blamed” on
its heterogeneity. But perhaps the fact is that heterogeneity is what makes schizophrenia what it
is, so that it would be the concept which has to match up to it, rather than trying to reduce it to a
collections of symptoms and mechanisms. Nevertheless, the “symptoms” of schizophrenia can and
should be understood in their own right, as human psychopathological phenomena, and not merely
sub-products of a malfunctioning brain. This is not to say that we should consider possible cerebral
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anomalies—be they antecedents or consequences of psychotic
alteration. The symptoms may be the very expression of a
“disordered self,” and at the same time represent efforts to
withstand the collapse or crisis itself (Stanghellini and Rosfort,
2015).
Despite the hegemony of the neurobiological perspective, the
debate over the nature of schizophrenia remains open (van Os,
2016). This debate is essentially framed in terms of whether
schizophrenia is above all a natural condition or a human
condition (Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008b). These two perspectives—
neurobiological and psychological—, must be taken into account
and combined appropriately, but the crucial question is how
this is done, giving pre-eminence (chronological, ontological,
and epistemological) to one or to the other. Given that it is the
dominant conception today, we know what the neurobiological
approach has to offer: the dissatisfaction and uncertainty already
mentioned.
As far as this article is concerned, we shall argue, with the
support of data and sound reasoning, for a consideration of
schizophrenia first and foremost as a disorder of the person,
rather than of the brain. This is a question that cannot be
solved on the basis of facts, in terms of Popperian empirical
hypotheses. You have to go “beyond the facts,” not to deconstruct
schizophrenia as an entity (Nasrallah et al., 2011), but to
situate it as a human condition. Schizophrenia considered as a
human condition has existential implications for understanding
its way of being, as well as scientific with regard to its study
from the perspective of human sciences including psychology
and psychiatry, more than the neurobiological or biomedical
natural sciences. Specifically, we shall put forward seven reasons.
Each one refers to an issue under debate and therefore not
closed and assigned to the neurobiological perspective, but open
to argument in psychological, phenomenological, and cultural
terms. The fact that we are talking about matters central
to schizophrenia, open and debatable, calls into question the
neurobiological approach as an indisputable reference. Each one
of these reasons, numbered from 1 to 7, deserves a whole essay
dedicated to itself, but here they are presented within the thread
of an argument, so that, as it were, the string is worth more than
the pearls.
SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A DISORDER OF
IPSEITY
The conceptualization of schizophrenia presented here mainly
follows the developments resulting from the work of US
psychologist Louis Sass and Danish psychiatrist Joseph Parnas
(Sass and Parnas, 2003), among that of many others. According
to this conception, the basic fact underlying the “symptoms” by
which schizophrenia is diagnosed is a particular alteration of
the experience of the self, or as we shall express it, of ipseity.
Ipseity constitutes the pre-reflective bodily self-experience, so
that it is also called “basic self ” or “minimal self ” (Cermolacce
et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2014). Thus, ipseity constitutes the
basic structure of the self, whose aspects are sense of ownership
and sense of agency (Gallagher, 2007). Sense of ownership
is proprioceptive, the pre-reflective experience or feeling that
I am the subject who is having the thought or doing the
movement (“I am thinking” or “I am moving”). The sense of
agency is the pre-reflective experience or feeling in which I
am the cause or author of the thought or movement. From
this perspective, schizophrenia is conceived as a disorder of
ipseity.
An increasing body of literature from recent years is providing
a renewed understanding of schizophrenia from this perspective
(Bürgy, 2008; Fuchs, 2010; Sass et al., 2011; Henriksen and
Parnas, 2012; Parnas, 2012; Akroyd, 2013; Nelson et al., 2014;
Parnas and Henriksen, 2014; Sass, 2014; Fielding-Smith et al.,
2015; Irarrázaval, 2015; Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2015; Maiese,
2016; Stanghellini and Aragona, 2016). A model of schizophrenia
as an ipseity-disturbance has arisen.
The Ipseity-Disturbance Model
Alterations of ipseity in schizophrenia have three aspects (Sass
and Parnas, 2003; Sass, 2014): hyper-reflexivity, diminished self-
affection, and alteration of articulation with the world. Whilst the
first two aspects involve a disturbance of the normal pre-reflective
sense of self as the center of the experience and action, the third
one involves the alteration of normal vital contact with reality.
Hyper-reflexivity refers to a type of intensified self-
consciousness, in which aspects of oneself that are normally
or functionally unnoticed, pre-reflective, tacit or implicit,
are objectivized and experienced as objects of consciousness.
The reflexivity referred to here is not a type of intellectual,
volitional or “reflective” self-consciousness. The hyper-reflexivity
characteristic of schizophrenia is an “operative” hyper-reflexivity
that occurs automatically, as though the “operating system”
of normal psychological functioning were objectivized, no
longer remaining tacitly as a background or medium, and
became transformed into a figure and an obstacle. This does not
mean that schizophrenia does not also involve an intellectual,
introspective, metacognitive type of hyper-reflexivity. A variety
of bodily experiences occur at the onset of schizophrenia,
consisting in experiencing one’s own body as an object lived in
the third person. Thus, a patient says: “I am no longer myself
(...) I feel strange. I am no longer in my body, it is someone
else; (...) I hear my voice when I speak, but the voice seems to
originate from some other place.” When he does something, he
has a feeling of observing his actions as a witness, without being
actively involved: “One might think that my person is no longer
here (...) I walk like a machine;” (Parnas and Handest, 2003, pp.
126–127).
Diminished self-affection refers to a decline in consciousness
of oneself as the subject of experience and of action. There is
a diminished self-presence in which the sense of self and the
sense of immersion in the world lose their vitality and position.
The experience ends up as one of passivity, automaticity, and
alienation. The most prominent aspect in the stages preceding
the onset of schizophrenia is a type of disturbance in which
the self does not saturate experience: “I don’t feel myself ”; “I
am turning inhuman”; “My consciousness is not as whole as
it should be”; “I am half awake”; “My I-feeling is diminished.”
(Parnas and Handest, 2003, p. 125). The sense of agency, and
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even of ownership in relation to it being oneself who is having
the experiences, are diminished, to the extreme of passivity,
automaticity, and alienation.
Alteration of articulation with the world refers to a loss of vital
contact with reality. The transformation of ipseity just mentioned
(hyper-reflexivity and diminished self-affection) is accompanied
by a certain alteration of the objects and field of consciousness;
that is, some disruption of the normal configuration of things
according to their context. The world appears decontextualized,
so that things lose the articulation and context that are taken
for granted in accordance with “common sense” and everyday
practical life. The world loses its familiarity and context, and
one feels strange and perplexed. Others seem dehumanized and
devitalized, as though they were not human beings, or only
apparently so. This schizophrenic experience is conceived in
clinical phenomenology as loss of natural self-evidence or crisis
of common sense (Stanghellini J., 2004). Table 1 shows the
components of the ipseity-disturbance model.
Validity of the Schizophrenia Concept in
Terms of Ipseity
The heterogeneity of schizophrenia, which called into question
its established nosological and neurobiological conception
(Keshavan et al., 2011; van Os, 2016), ceases to be “surprising”
from the perspective of self. Disturbances of ipseity would
constitute the “center of gravity” of the diverse symptoms that
characterize schizophrenia in its different phases: prodromal,
early, and chronic.
In relation to conceptual validity, alterations of ipseity can be
shown to be implicated in each of the three major syndromes
of schizophrenia recognized in contemporary research: the
“positive,” “negative,” and “disorganization” syndromes (Sass,
2003, 2014; Sass and Parnas, 2003; Parnas, 2015). Likewise,
deficits of social cognition and of interpersonal relations are
understood on the basis of the alteration of ipseity (Nelson
et al., 2009; Heering et al., 2016). Contradictions of emotion
in schizophrenia between “numbness” or “flat affect” and
intense affectivity and hypersensitivity to emotional stimuli can
be understood in terms of the alteration of self-experience
involved (Sass, 2007; see also Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2013). A
phenomenological interview easily highlights the disturbance of
ipseity at the bottom of psychotic symptoms. Another thing is
understanding the transition from ipseity-disturbance to frank
psychosis. From a phenomenological viewpoint what occurs is
understood within a process of alienation and externalization or
dissociation and depersonalization after the loss of the anchoring
center of ipseity (Hirjak et al., 2013):
At the beginning, the patients’ impulses and bodily actions
are not embedded in the first person perspective anymore.
Parallel with motoric fragmentation and hyperreflexivity,
drives to carry out actions and bodily movements become
disembodied, alienated, and finally externalized. The patients
lose control over their body, and its actions now emanate from
an external power (Hirjak et al., 2013, p. 7).
In particular, a model based on the dialogical self has been
proposed for auditory verbal hallucinations, which understands
the voices as dialogical experiences resulting from dissociation of
the I-positions (Perona-Garcelán et al., 2015).
As regards discriminant validity, schizophrenia as a disorder
of the self-permits better differentiation with respect to bipolar
disorder and to normality. Regardless of the symptoms that
psychoses may share, studies focusing on subjective experiences
reveal basic differences, especially in the domains of self-
awareness, articulation of pre-reflective meaning, and perceptual
experience (Parnas et al., 2003; Raballo et al., 2011). Whilst
schizophrenic people are characterized by, among other aspects,
disorders of attunement (“We would need a universal system
that covers individual situations”), melancholic people are
characterized by orderliness (a need to preserve harmony in
TABLE 1 | The ipseity-disturbance model.
Ipseity Ipseity-disturbance Examples
Sense of oneself as existing as a vital and
self-identical subject of experience and
action and as a first-person perspective on
the world.
Disturbed “mineness”; disorder of self-presence;
lack of sense of self.
“Consciousness gradually loses its coherence. The center
cannot hold. The “me” becomes a haze, and the solid center
from which one experiences reality breaks up like a bad radio
signal. There is no longer a vantage point from which to look
out, take things in, assess. No core holds things together,
providing the lens through which we see the world” (Saks,
2007). “[M]y sense of self is totally crushed when the “bubble”
surrounding my self-consciousness is destroyed by this
unstable permeability. [...] until the entire self-experience
disintegrates.” (Kean, 2009).
Hyper-reflexivity: intensified self-consciousness that
involves self-alienation.
Corporeal sensations; de-automatization; thoughts-aloud etc.
Diminished self-affection: diminished sense of
existing as the subject of one’s own experience and
action.
De-vitalization; feeling influenced; de-personalization.
“Disturbed hold” or “grip” on the world; alteration of
attunement to the world.
Estrangement; de-realization; feeling persecuted; confusion
between perception/imagination/memory; uncanny sense of
“revelation.”
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interpersonal relations) (Stanghellini J., 2004). If in melancholy
one feels imprisoned inside one’s body, unable to transcend it, in
schizophrenia one does not inhabit the body in the immediate
sense, insofar as it is reified (Fuchs, 2005; see also Sass and
Pienkos, 2013, 2015).
Alterations of ipseity also improve predictive validity. The
most well-established concept for early detection is an “ultra-
high-risk” profile: UHR, which includes attenuated psychotic
symptoms, transitory psychotic symptoms and risk factors
such as schizotypy, family history and anxious and depressive
states (Yung et al., 2004). Even though criteria based on
UHR represent important progress, they nevertheless present
some limitations related to their superficial symptomatic nature.
After all, predicting psychosis through attenuated or transitory
psychotic symptoms is, according to Nelson et al. (2008), like
predicting extreme heat through an increase in temperature,
without identifying the fire that may be causing this change (p.
384). It is not the symptoms themselves that put an individual at
risk, but rather the core or underlying alteration of vulnerability.
Indeed, the inclusion of self-disorders together with UHR criteria
improves their predictive value (Koren et al., 2016; Raballo et al.,
2016). The predictive validity of alterations of subjectivity has
also been shown in the detection of subclinical configurations of
schizotypy (Raballo and Parnas, 2011). As these authors stress,
the “silent side” of the schizophrenia spectrum is the alteration of
subjectivity, overlooked until now.
THE MODERN ORIGIN OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Although schizophrenia is usually assumed to be a permanent
disorder, inherent to the human being, there are good reasons
to claim it as a recent phenomenon (Greenfeld, 2013; López-Ibor
and López-Ibor, 2014a,b). Its recent origin would be situated in
the 18th century, with an increasing and acknowledged incidence
throughout the 19th century. The reasons behind arguments
that it is a recent phenomenon are of two types: empirical and
conceptual.
Empirical Reasons: Notable Incidence
since the 19th Century and a Telling
Absence Prior to It
Much of the data and hypotheses about the recent origin of
schizophrenia are provided by Edward Hare in his compilation
of previous works entitled On the History of Lunacy (Hare,
1998) and by Fuller Torrey and Judy Miller in The invisible
plague (Torrey and Miller, 2007). In reality, Torrey was the first
to propose this hypothesis in systematic fashion, highlighting
both the growing incidence of schizophrenia in the wake of
industrialization and the scarce proof of its existence prior to it
(Torrey, 1980).
The first unequivocal description of a case of schizophrenia
dates from 1810, According to both Carpenter (1989) and Torrey
and Miller (2007, p. 40). This is the case of James Tilly Matthews,
admitted to the Bethlam Hospital in London, described by John
Haslam in Illustrations of madness (Haslam, 1810/1988). As
Carpenter (1989) points out, it is the first extensive and detailed
description dealing with a variety of anomalous experiences of
schizophrenia, among them the “influencing machine” and the
apotheosis and reification of the self, which were unlikely to have
been described prior to that case. Matthews appears to provide
the first example in what would become a long-running theme
of “influencing machines,” from the case of Nathalie described
by Viktor Tausk in 1919 (Tausk, 1919/1933) to today’s cases
described by Hirjak and Fuchs (2010). The case of Matthews
also seems to be the first reflecting the peculiar experience of the
modern self between grandiosity and alienation (Sass, 1992). As
the doctors at the hospital reported, Matthews felt “sometimes,
an automaton moved by agency of persons, [...] at others,
the Emperor of the whole world, issuing proclamations to his
disobedient subjects, and hurling from their thrones the usurpers
of his dominions.” (Haslam, 1810/1988, p. 2). See López-Ibor and
López-Ibor (2014b) for the case of Hölderlin.
It is natural for us to wonder whether there might have been
some cases of schizophrenia in previous times. In response to
this question, it should be stated first of all that if there were
any, they were certainly far less frequent than in the period from
the 18th century onwards (Torrey, 1980; Hare, 1998; López-Ibor
and López-Ibor, 2014a). A merely clinical, symptomatic concept
might keep some in the net, though they would still be different
in essence. Although schizophrenia patients have been reported
everywhere, “culture dictates whether and how experiences and
behaviors are defined: as schizophrenia-like illness, other type of
illness, or non-illness phenomena” (Fraguas, 2009, p. 67).
The case of George Trosse, as told by himself in 1692–1693,
is invoked in comparison to the recent hypothesis (Jeste et al.,
1985). However, his “symptoms” as shown by Roy Porter, are
understood in terms of a “psychomachia” between God and
Satan typical of the times, more a religious crisis than a proper
crisis of the Self (Porter, 1989, Chapter 5; see also Hare, 1988).
With regard to the cases proposed by Heinrichs (2003), one
from the 18th century and another from the 14th, the first
with persecutory and grandiose delusions and hallucinations,
is not out of keeping with the origin of schizophrenia at that
time, while the “symptoms” of the second are difficult to see as
separate from the religious and allegorical conceptions of the
preceding Middle Ages. As Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach
justifiably argue: “we find that modern attempts to diagnose
medieval mystics and ascetics out of context to their environment
and disregarding a commitment to God that constituted the
urgent and central feature of their lives is an exercise in cultural
insensitivity and conceit. The medieval mystics and ascetics did
not have the major forms of mental illness such as schizophrenia
and manic-depressive psychosis and their drive to God cannot be
explained by recourse to such formulations” (Kroll and Bachrach,
2005, p. 208).
Looking for schizophrenia in Ancient Greece and Rome
would also be inappropriate. Epic, tragic, philosophical, or
medical madness, according to the different models (Simon,
1978), is not schizophrenia avant la lettre, nor should we expect
it to be, given that the classical self is not the modern self (Pérez-
Álvarez, 2008). For their part, Socrates’ voices were voices of
reason, not of madness (Leudar and Thomas, 2000). As far as
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Ancient Rome is concerned, the authors of a systematic review
of the literature conclude that: “we were unable to identify any
descriptions of chronic psychotic disorders in either fiction or
accounts of historical figures that would qualify for a diagnosis
of schizophrenia” (Evans et al., 2003, p. 327).
Although the absence of evidence of schizophrenia before the
18th century is not evidence of absence, the discussion of cases
brought up and reviews cited support the hypothesis of its recent
origin, more than placing it in doubt. In addition, there are
conceptual reasons related to the affinity between schizophrenia
and modern culture.
Conceptual Reasons: Affinity between
Schizophrenia and Modern Culture
What is the explanation for the fact that schizophrenia is a
relatively recent phenomenon? Everything points to some kind
of environmental change. Both Hare and Torrey and Miller
suggest a cause of infectious origin. Torrey and Miller refer,
moreover, to diet, alcohol, and toxins, as well as the medical
care that today saves children susceptible to the illness, but
who would previously have died, as potential ways in which the
emergence of schizophrenia could be related to industrialization
and urbanization. In any case, as they acknowledge, “epidemic
insanity remains one of the great enigmas of contemporary
medicine and demands novel approaches in thinking about its
causes” (Torrey and Miller, 2007, p. 330). A “novel approach”
to the historical causes of schizophrenia would involve situating
its emergence in the context of modern culture. Industrialization
and urbanization are fundamental, but undoubtedly not because
of diet, alcohol, toxins, or infections, but rather due to the new
way of life they imply (Cooper and Sartorius, 1977; Greenfeld,
2013; López-Ibor and López-Ibor, 2014a).
Two aspects characteristic of modern culture are highlighted.
These are the peculiar configuration of the modern self and
the drastic social transformation resulting from the process of
industrialization and urbanization.
Assuming that the way the self is considered in the society of
reference is fundamental to an understanding of schizophrenia
(Fabrega, 1989), the modern self would be at the root of this
modern origin and character of schizophrenia. We are talking
about a self which from the Renaissance onwards has followed an
individualistic and internalizing trend. Whilst the individualistic
tendency consists basically in a growing separation between the
individual and society, the internalizing tendency consists in
the separation within the individual of interior and exterior. As
shown by Norbert Elias, an invisible wall between one individual
and another, and between the self and the universe, as well as
between the “internal world” and the “external world” begins
to rise up at the dawn of the Modern era (Elias, 2000, 2001).
The subject has separated from the object, from the world
and from others, and subjectivity has acquired its own reality,
to the extreme of even being more real than the world-out-
there.
In line with this modern self, thought can become considered
as more real than reality, and reality, in turn, as an illusion.
Schizophrenia would be the apotheosis of this particular
configuration of the self. This duality of consciousness, Sass says,
is common to modern thought and to schizophrenia: on the one
hand, the solipsism that exalts the mind and derealizes the world,
and on the other, the reification of the subject, converted into just
one more thing in the world (Sass, 1992, p. 328). As Stanghellini
remarks in this regard:
It is legitimate to think that this radical dualism between a
subject who is thinking and an object that is conceived of a
pure and simple extensive externalness—pure consciousness
and pure materialness—is the fundamental eidos of both
modernity and schizophrenic depersonalization (Stanghellini
J., 2004, p. 155).
At the basis of these changes and as a consequence of a
whole series of transformations—economic, political, social,
religious, etc.—is the great transformation of the society of
communities into the society of individuals. In the community,
individuals form part and consider themselves members of
more extensive structures, such as the immediate family, the
extended family, the neighborhood, the village, one’s trade, the
Church, and so on, against the background of tradition and
customs. Without trying to claim that such forms of relation
are idyllic and free from conflict, distrust, or whatever, people
are certainly not strangers to one another. But the community
began to dissolve, and in its place there developed a society of
individuals (Elias, 2001), represented by cities from the 18th
century onwards, populated by “strangers,” and not in the
sense of “people from outside,” but actually “strangers,” “strange
people.”
THE JUVENILE ONSET OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is a disorder with onset at the end of adolescence,
its peak age in incidence being around twenty. It is no accident
that prior to the term schizophrenia, this disorder was considered
as particular to youth and referred to as hebephrenia, a word
coined by Hecker, and inspired by Hebe, the Greek goddess of
youth. Schizophrenia is linked to adolescence and youth by both
its historical origin and its psychopathological developmental
roots (Stanghellini G., 2004).
The Historical Parallel between
Schizophrenia and Adolescence
The historical coincidence should not be overlooked. As far
as schizophrenia is concerned, we have already established its
modern origins. As regards adolescence, there have always been
adolescents and young people, but as a problematic age range
and condition it exists only since the 18th or 19th century (Ariès,
1996). If childhood was a “discovery” of the 18th century, as a
distinctive stage (until then the child had been considered an
adult in miniature), adolescence would be a discovery of the 19th
century, as a space that opened up between childhood and adult
life. This liminal space represents a critical stage in the formation
of personal identity (Erikson, 1968).
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The principal consideration about the possible historical
affinity between schizophrenia and adolescence has to do with
the process of urbanization and what it implies: migration from
the countryside to the city and the dissolution of traditional
ways of life, as referred to above. Migration from the land to
the city and urbanism as a new way of life represent the great
transformation, already mentioned, from community to society.
Community ways of life are dissolved, and taking their place is a
city populated by individuals. Individuals now have to make their
way, establish themselves, become something through their own
efforts, starting from scratch: family tradition, their own family,
the village, their trade, the community—the whole framework
of life prior to becoming city dwellers—no longer count for
anything (Elias, 2001).
Although migration from country to city also affects children,
adults and the elderly, it is reasonable for it to have had a
particular impact on adolescence as a critical age in the formation
of one’s identity and situation in the world. In fact, as Richard
Sennett shows in his work The Fall of Public Man, “unattached
youth” made up most of the growing cities in the decades
up to 1750, strangers and “strange people” (Sennett, 1978). It
is not being insinuated that the origin of schizophrenia is in
migration, but rather in general transformations of modern
society such as those mentioned. However, emigration then as
now, as discussed further below, could be an especially propitious
condition for a psychotic crisis, not to mention other disorders.
It is not a coincidence that at that time a “new” disorder began
to be observed, which not by coincidence either, was called
“hebephrenia.”
We have no demographic data or personal case histories to tell
us who the “hebephrenics” were and what their life circumstances
were like. Hecker himself, indeed, complained that these patients
arrived at the hospitals already in late stages of the illness. In
any case, it can be conceived of as a crisis related to the difficult
balance between the self and the world. The first case described by
Hecker, from 1871, appears more a response to life circumstances
than the consequences of biology. The case reported by Hecker
is of a 20-year-old who talks to himself, remains apart from
others, and laughs or becomes angry for no apparent reason. He
is evasive in his answers. For example, to the question “‘How
are thing’s going?’, he mysteriously replies ‘Well. You need to
at least have your own freedom.’ He’s disobedient, contrary,
bothersome, and quarrelsome [...] and answers all questions with
these enigmatic words: ‘But my eyes! But my eyes!”’ (Stanghellini
G., 2004, p. 473). Nothing is known about this disorganized
behavior, and it may be on a one-way road, whereby the behaviors
themselves gradually may constitute feedback loops in which the
possibilities of life become narrowed, leading down a path to a
development disorder in continuation.
In the absence of the data that would be useful here, it might
make sense to consider current phenomena that undoubtedly
correspond, in some measure, to what occurred in the 18th and
19th centuries. We refer to the high incidence of schizophrenia
among current immigrants from traditional communities in
European cities (which would constitute the fifth reason), as well
as the better prognosis for schizophrenia in developing countries
(the fourth reason for consideration).
Schizophrenia as a Developmental
Disorder
The neurodevelopmental model is well established (Catts
et al., 2013; Haller et al., 2014). Two critical periods for
prefrontal cortical development have been described, early
prenatal and adolescence. A wide spectrum of environmental
factors impinging on the brain during these critical periods can
modify the trajectory for prefrontal cortical development and
shift the balance toward mental illnesses such as schizophrenia
(Selemon and Zecevic, 2015). Many studies have demonstrated
high levels of cytokines and other signs of immune system
activation. Furthermore, cytokines are critically involved in early
neurodevelopment and deviations from the norm can result in
abnormal neuroanatomy and brain chemistry (Howard, 2013;
Ratnayake et al., 2013).
The meaning of the data depends on how schizophrenia is
theorized. According to Catts et al., “When theorizing about
the neurodevelopmental basis of schizophrenia, schizophrenia
could be considered to result from a failure to reach the
final state of cortical maturation resulting in retainment of an
immature cortex (at least transiently)” (Catts et al., 2013, p. 18).
However, it may also be theorized based on psychodevelopment
within the framework of a conception of schizophrenia as
an ipseity disorder. On one hand, it would be the gulf
between molecular conditions and the schizophrenia experience,
a distance still greater than the one recognized by Freud between
the Oedipus complex and killing one’s father. On the other,
it would be the decisive role of the environment beginning
with the interpersonal role as etiopathogenic and restorative.
In this respect, Catts et al refer to the psychosocially informed
approach of McGorry (2011) for “stabilize the adolescent
brain” (Catts et al., 2013, p. 18). Finally, it would be the
evidence itself and theorization from a sociodevelopmental
perspective which includes neurodevelopmental factors. But
the neurodevelopmental perspective also includes psychosocial
factors. The question lies in whether one gives primacy to the
formation of the brain or the formation of the self. These two
“formations,” we need hardly add, are mutually implicated, and
must be considered thus.
However, there are good reasons for approaching the issue
from the psychodevelopmental side. For a start, the basic fact
that schizophrenia, as we have argued, is a certain alteration of
the self. And as is well known, adolescence is a critical period
in the formation of the self. It is not a case of leaving out
the brain, but neither of putting it first, as the neurobiological
perspective does. The brain itself may be modulated, thanks to
its plasticity, by culture, life circumstances and efforts to adapt
to the world (Toyokawa et al., 2012). So as not to incur in the
usual neurocentric explanation, the interactive brain hypothesis
is claimed here as a mediating organ of (Fuchs, 2011; Di Paolo
and De Jaegher, 2012), neither causal nor creating, according to
an embodied, embedded and enactive approach. Contrary to the
neurocentric and individualist approach,
the enactive approach foregrounds a different notion of the
living body (of which the brain is a part) in its ongoing sense-
making relation to the world. According to this approach,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1650
Pérez-Álvarez et al. Rethinking Schizophrenia
the brain is understood as embedded, not in a protective and
nourishing casing, but in ongoing circular processes of sense-
making that pass through it, the body and the world; in other
words it is understood as amediating organ (Fuchs, 2011) with
all the implications that this view has for the study of brain
function (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012, p. 13).
There is a well-documented affinity between certain
characteristics of adolescence and schizophrenia (Harrop
and Trower, 2003). These would be normal characteristics of
adolescence, such as feeling special and unique, and an intensified
self-awareness. Likewise, quasi-psychotic experiences are
common in adolescence, akin to those found in schizophrenia—
thinking that the things coming out of the TV have special
significance for oneself, believing that people can read other
people’s minds, and so on (Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2011). In this
sense, schizophrenia could be understood as an exaggerated,
pathological form of adolescent experiences. Although the vast
majority of adolescents do not attain schizophrenia, it is also true
that the majority of cases of schizophrenia have their beginnings
in adolescence.
In line with Harrop and Trower (2003), it is understood that
those who develop schizophrenia have become bogged down in
some way during adolescence. This may occur when there is
a lack of individuation with respect to one’s parents, or when
the adolescent fails to forge bonds with peers. In either case,
the adolescent will become bogged down in a whole range of
disturbances, among them psychotic-type experiences.
Adversities, Dissociation, and
Schizophrenia
Beyond such situations of stagnation in adolescence, it is
necessary to consider patterns of attachment and traumatic
experiences. The theory of attachment permits an understanding
of the relation between types of interpersonal events and the
development of adult disorders (Read and Gumley, 2008). For
its part, trauma is practically the sole recognized cause of
schizophrenia, despite not being specific to this disorder, nor
probably at the origin of all cases (Read et al., 2005; Morgan and
Fisher, 2007). Likewise, a growing body of research consistently
shows that dissociation is a mediating variable between, on the
one hand, disorganized attachment and trauma, and on the other,
psychotic symptoms (Moskowitz, 2011; Perona-Garcelán et al.,
2012).
In terms of neurophysiological mechanisms, dysregulation
of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is probably
implicated in schizophrenia (Howes and Kapur, 2009). It is
understood that sensitization of the HPA axis is the common
final route, so that repeated exposure probably increases
the behavioral, cognitive, experiential, and neurophysiological
responses to the new stress, with the possible consequence
of increasing risk for psychotic experience. In this line, it
is conceivable that there is involvement of neurobiological
mechanisms and epigenetic changes, in response to the impact of
one’s experiences and of a pressurizing environment (Toyokawa
et al., 2012).
If we accept that the adversities of life have chronological
and etiological priority in the development of schizophrenia,
through psychological alterations (such as dissociation) and the
corresponding neurobiological mechanisms (e.g., sensitization
of the HPA axis), we can propose a sociodevelopmental model,
alternative to the current neurodevelopmental one (Read et al.,
2009; Morgan and Hutchinson, 2010a; Read, 2013). Figure 1
schematizes this sociodevelopmental model. What the figure
is designed to show is that the dissociation/depersonalization
emerges in the theory and in research as the mediation between
the adversities of life and the alterations that characterize
schizophrenia. The three terms of the model, adversities—
dissociation—schizophrenia, are situated against the background
of modern culture-society.
BETTER PROGNOSIS FOR
SCHIZOPHRENIA IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
Schizophrenia has better prognosis in developing countries than
in the developed world. This is a surprising but consistent
finding, and among those reported in studies sponsored by the
World Health Organization (WHO). Three large studies have
been carried out (Sartorius, 2007): International Pilot Study of
Schizophrenia (IPSS), Determinants of Outcome of Severe Mental
Diseases (DOSMeD), and International Study of Schizophrenia
(ISoS).
Robust and Sustainable Finding
“For all variables considered, the schizophrenic patients in
Ibadan, Agra, and Cali (all centers in developing countries)
tended to have a better outcome on average than the
schizophrenic patients in the other six centers” (Sartorius, 2007,
p. 5). This result from the first study (IPSS) was repeated
in the following studies. Thus, referring to the second study
(DOSMeD), a significantly higher percentage (56%) of the
subjects in developing counties exhibit “mild” patterns of course,
compared to their counterparts in developed counties (39%). At
the same time, a significantly higher percentage (40%) of the cases
in developed countries had “severe” patterns of course, compared
to the cases in developing countries (24%). The third study (ISoS)
confirms the previous findings (Sartorius, 2007).
The fact of the existence of schizophrenia in developing
countries does not necessarily contradict the thesis about its
recent origin in the context of modern society. As developing
countries, with Western-style psychiatric attention centers, these
countries are modern to some degree, and in the same proportion
appear to have schizophrenia, not yet developed, perhaps due to
the persistence of community structures.
What Do Less Developed Countries Have
That Produce a Lower Incidence of
Schizophrenia?
Whatever it is, it probably has to do with the different ways of life
found in a traditional community-based society, in contrast to
a modern society of individuals, as discussed already in relation
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FIGURE 1 | Schema of the Sociodevelopmental Model of Schizophrenia. The model is characterized by the mediation of dissociation/depersonalization
between life adversities and the symptoms that define schizophrenia. It is understood that between the adversities of life and dissociation/depersonalization there is
mutual influence, and that, in turn, schizophrenia can be one more adversity. The three terms of the model are situated against the background of modern
culture-society, whose notable aspects are urbanism as the most characteristic medium of modern life, the peculiar configuration of the self, with its autistic
(“schizoid”) tendency, and the notion of life adversities, in whatever form.
to the recent origin of schizophrenia. As Cooper and Sartorius
(1977) argue, the current situation of developing countries may
be similar to that of many Western countries during the great
transformation of pre-modern into modern society. In this line,
Lin and Kleinman (1988) highlight five conditions that can
explain the better prognosis for patients in non-industrialized
countries, referring to social support, the family environment,
the nature of work, stigma, and the differential survival rates
of vulnerable individuals. In any case, over and above any lists
of characteristic social factors, it would be necessary to carry
out anthropological studies revealing everyday ways of life in
relation to those who have psychotic access, such as that of
Juli McGruder in Zanzibar, Tanzania (McGruder, 2004). From
McGruder’s study, which resulted from her living with various
families with schizophrenic members, three aspects should be
highlighted (McGruder, 2004; Watters, 2010).
One of these is that the idea that people in traditional cultures
have a simpler and less stressful life is just a fantasy in the
heads of Western people. The toughness of life, social conflicts,
wars, family problems—they are far from free of such challenges.
The supposed lack of or lower level of stress is not what is
behind the more “benign” schizophrenias found there. Another
aspect is the social-moral status of the member of the family
who is ill, as opposed to a particular-individual status, which
precludes criticism and hostility. If the illness has to do with
“tests from God” (or Allah) and possession by spirits that form
part of the universe of that community, it becomes normalized in
the broad context of the family. The third aspect is the normal
acceptance and tolerance of the ill person. It is a naturalized
tolerance, described byMcGruder in terms of acquiescence in the
face of adversity and the embracing of difficulties as part of life
(McGruder, 2004).
In this context it is understood that mental illness has less
stigma attached to it than it would in a medical context. As
Watters (2010) remarks in relation to McGruder’s study, what
could be more stigmatizing than reducing a person’s perceptions
and beliefs to the notion that they are “just chemistry?” This is
a narrative that often drives a person out of the group, allowing
those remaining within the social circle to see the ill person as
“almost a different species” (Watters, 2010, p. 195).
THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA AMONG MIGRANTS
High rates of schizophrenia have repeatedly been found over the
last 20 years among immigrants from various countries in a range
of European cities (Coid et al., 2008). It is now emerging a similar
problem with refugees (Hollander et al., 2016).
A Challenging Phenomenon for Psychiatry
Quite apart from the public health tragedy involved, this
phenomenon represents quite a challenge for psychiatry (Morgan
and Hutchinson, 2010b). Its impact for psychiatry concerns the
aetiology, pathophysiology and treatment of schizophrenia, and
hence its conception and scientific and clinical status. This high
rate of schizophrenia, within its variability in the different studies,
is between 2 and 8 times that for the indigenous British or Dutch
populations. At the same time, it is high in the same proportion
with respect to its incidence in the populations of their countries
of origin. The finding is robust and consistent, and is not subject
to methodological artifacts, since the studies have been repeated
and improved and the reviews are increasingly exacting (Coid
et al., 2008; Morgan and Hutchinson, 2010b).
However, not all immigrants in Europe show high rates of
schizophrenia. This phenomenon is notable among migrants
from the West Indies, in particular African-Caribbeans, and also
among Moroccans, but this does not seem to be the case among
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migrants from Asia or Turkey. The incidence of schizophrenia
among Asian immigrants in London is lower than that for other
groups, and similar to that for the populations of their destination
and origin (Chang et al., 2011), even though levels among Asian
women are increasing (Coid et al., 2008). Likewise, the incidence
of schizophrenia among Turkish immigrants in Holland is lower
than it is among other groups (Veling et al., 2007).
Various explanations are put forward for the findings.
The self-selection explanation often proposed, according to
which migrants would be those with some predisposition to
psychosis, together with explanations based on genetic and
neurobiological causes, have been discredited by the data (van
der Ven et al., 2015). It is the turn of an explanation in
environmental terms, be they biological, social or an interaction
of the two. Among the biological factors investigated, no
increased prevalence has been found for birth complications or
neurobiological abnormalities diagnosed; as far as drug abuse
is concerned, rates are not significantly higher among migrants
(Morgan and Hutchinson, 2010b). Other “suspects” would be
vitamin D and epigenetic mechanisms. There remain the social
factors.
Social Causes of Schizophrenia
A number of social factors are involved: urban stress,
unemployment, poverty, family separation, racial discrimination,
and so on. Two explanations have been proposed: social defeat
theory and the sociodevelopmental model, already introduced in
our discussion of the juvenile onset of schizophrenia.
The theory of social defeat refers to a particular pattern of
social interaction whereby people are the victims of disdain,
humiliation, and subordination from others (Selten et al.,
2013). Social defeat theory integrates social, psychological and
biological mechanisms (in that order) to account for the
development of psychotic symptoms. In accordance with this
proposal, continued and chronic experiences of social defeat
imply a sensitization of the mesolimbic dopamine system and/or
increased basal activity of this system, and hence a higher risk of
schizophrenia, insofar as the dopaminergic system appears to be
involved in it.
The sociodevelopmental model emerges in relation to the
abundant and robust evidence showing the link between not only
migration, but also a broader range of experiences and social and
psychological factors (trauma, social adversity), and the onset of
psychosis (Morgan and Hutchinson, 2010a; Morgan et al., 2014).
Thus, it has been seen how repeated exposure to social adversity
can be linked to psychosis through delusional ideas, as well as the
processes of dissociation and depersonalization mentioned above
(Perona-Garcelán et al., 2012).
And what of the lower incidence of schizophrenia observed
among Asian and Turkish immigrants in European cities? These
differences in favor of Asians and Turks probably have to do
with the fact that their system of emigration incorporates the
family and their own customs wherever they go (Veling et al.,
2007; Coid et al., 2008). They maintain the community at their
destination, so to speak, in contrast to the case of “solitary”
individuals in other systems of migration. For example, Turks
in The Hague perceive less discrimination and show lower
incidence of schizophrenia than Moroccans, even though they
have similarly low economic status (Veling et al., 2007). Similar
regarding to Asians:
It has been suggested that the more cohesive cultural, ethnic,
and religious structure of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi
communities may confer greater social support than in
other groups that may otherwise share similar levels of
discrimination. That the excess risk of psychoses for Asian
immigrants in our sample appeared to be restricted to women
provides anecdotal support for the social defeat hypothesis
given the additional pressure of marginal status faced by some
women in Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi communities
(Coid et al., 2008, p. 1256).
If we are to take culture seriously—and it is high time we
did—it is these types of aspects (emigration systems, social
integration, etc.), that we need to study, no less than the genes,
chromosomatic alleles, and neurodevelopmental trajectories.
THE GENETIC MYTH OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
There is, one might say, a genetic myth in relation to
schizophrenia, whereby authors speak of 80% heritability, a
concordance of 40–50% between monozygotic twins and a
worldwide prevalence of 1% (Gottesman, 1990; Sullivan, 2005;
van Os and Kapur, 2009; Keshavan et al., 2011). However, there
are also serious objections that should not be overlooked before
accepting this “genetic consensus.”
Statistical Genetics and “Real” Genetics
To begin with, the epidemiological, family, twin, and adoption
studies on which this myth is based do not adequately
support such assertions (Leo, 2003, 2016; Crow, 2008; Fleming
and Martin, 2011; Joseph, 2013; James, 2016). Both the
methodological problems of these studies and the intricate nature
of the very relationship between genetics and environment
preclude the establishment of percentages and causal relations, as
well as statements such as “schizophrenia is due mainly to genetic
effects” (Sullivan, 2005, p. 615). Thus, for example, in relation
to the supposed concordance of 40–50% between monozygotic
twins raised separately, quite apart from the fact that this reveals
both genetic and environmental influences, careful analysis of the
data shows that the concordance would actually be of the order of
15–25% (Leo, 2003; Joseph, 2013). However, and as these authors
stress, the question is not the accuracy of the percentage, but
rather the inextricability of genetics and environment, insofar as
genetics itself is modulated by the environment even while we are
in the womb.
The proposal of this argument is not to deny the heritability of
schizophrenia, but rather to insist that we cannot make assertions
in either percentage terms or strictly genetic terms, given the
need to take into account, as well as genetic transmission,
epigenetic, behavioral, and cultural transmission (Jablonka and
Raz, 2009; González-Pardo and Pérez-Álvarez, 2013). The fact
that schizophrenia runs in the family does not mean that it is in
the genes; after all, religion and accent, for example, also run in
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the family. Furthermore, the passing on of schizophrenia via the
family would be surprising, seeing as these individuals are by no
means the most prolific reproducers (Hare, 1998, chap. 6), and
sporadic cases, with no family antecedents, account for at least
half of the total.
“Real genetics,” with a molecular basis, has not done justice
to the optimism of “statistical genetics” by detecting major gene
effects in schizophrenia (Gottesman et al., 1987, p. 41). In 1987,
these authors were confident that molecular genetics would
confirm the statistical genetics. While the human genome has
been described and ground-breaking methods and projects have
been developed, the genes for schizophrenia are still nowhere to
be seen. From the most comprehensive genetic association study
of genes previously reported to contribute to the susceptibility
to schizophrenia, based on reasonable candidate genes, a
large, rigorously phenotyped sample and a dense set of single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) (Sanders et al., 2008), what
did the authors find? That “none of the polymorphisms were
associated with the schizophrenia phenotype at a reasonable
threshold for statistical significance” (Sanders et al., 2008, p. 504).
Although the disappointing study focused on candidate genes
may possibly continue, genetic research is adopting the genome-
wide association studies (GWAS) paradigm. In contrast to gene-
specific candidate-driven studies, GWAS investigate the entire
genome, in which hundreds of thousands of SNPs are tested for
association with a disease in hundreds or thousands of persons.
GWAS have revolutionized the search for genetic influences
on complex traits, identifying hundreds of genetic variants that
contribute to a variety of common traits and illnesses. But
even though dozens of genes have been linked to a trait or
disease, the individual and cumulative effects are disappointingly
small, and far from sufficient for explaining the previously
estimated heritability (Manolio, 2010). Larger and larger samples
are showing smaller and smaller effect sizes (James, 2016; Leo,
2016).
This disappointing finding has turned the issue of personal
genomes into the case of the missing heritability, a veritable
mystery (Zuk et al., 2011). The case of missing heritability
highlights the discrepancy between “statistical” genetics, on
which the genetic myth is based, and “real” genetics, in the
wake of the sequencing of the human genome. There are several
possibilities. A possibility is that the missing heritability consists,
partly, in copy-number variations (CNVs), emerging de novo, in
an individual without family history of mutation (Bassett et al.,
2010; Xu et al., 2011). However, and despite the enthusiasm with
which this strategy has been received, the truth is that CNVs
account for no more than 2% of schizophrenia in the general
population (Bassett et al., 2010). In reality, the majority of the
genetic variants so far identified (Sekar et al., 2016) confer very
small increments in risk of schizophrenia from 1.0 to 1.27%
(Ross, 2016).
A further possibility is that such or somuch heritability simply
does not exist, because it is over-estimated. Not to mention the
general public, the readers of scientific journals themselves are
“lured by the thesis that (1) a major thrust of psychosis research
is now genetic, (2) there is substantive progress, and (3) genes
that contribute to predisposition have already been identified.”
(Crow, 2008, p. 1681; Joseph, 2013; James, 2016; Leo, 2016; Ross,
2016).
From Genetics to Epigenetics: A Prominent
Role for the Environment and
Psychological Experiences
The genetic enthusiasm intensified by the advent of GWAS has
tended to overshadow the decisive role of environment in the
acknowledged G-E interactions, so that “better ontologies” are
needed (Thomas, 2010). In general, the G-E interaction tends
to be understood in accordance with a linear model, in which
the origin of the disorder is situated in the genome, waiting to
be “activated” by the environment (van Os and Poulton, 2009,
p. 57). This gene ontology reflects the “looking under the lamp
post” mentality, whereby bioinformatics data are easier to recruit
(Thomas, 2010). An authentic “gene ontology” must tackle the
full and complex reality, including the bidirectional, non-linear
relations between, on the one hand, genetic components and
cellular contexts, and on the other, environmental components,
which would include experiential, behavioral, social and cultural
factors. As we now know, what is decisive in human genetics is
what occurs above (epi), between the zygote and the development
of the organism, in a sociocultural context, studied by epigenetics
(González-Pardo and Pérez-Álvarez, 2013). As more is known
about the genetics of schizophrenia, environmental factors
appear to be the most important (Stepniak et al., 2014).
Epigenetics shows how there is environmental regulation
of the genome and its functions, whereby the different
genomic, contextual, and environmental components interact
non-additively throughout development (Gottlied, 2000). The
behavior of organisms themselves, in this case the phenotype,
influences the genome, both through its influence on the
environment and directly. We are identifying the epigenetic
and neuronal mechanisms through which behavior and the
social environment “get into the mind” (Toyokawa et al.,
2012). Thus, in relation to schizophrenia, it has been possible
to identify epigenetic mechanisms such as DNA methylation,
histone modifications, and chromatin remodeling (Rutten and
Mill, 2009). What is important to highlight here is that these
epigenetic changes occur in response to life adversities known
to be associated with schizophrenia, such as abuse in childhood
(Read et al., 2009; van Os et al., 2010; Brown, 2011). Possible
vulnerability to future experiences due to early epigenetic
changes should be understood in the context of original and
continued life adversities, according to bi-directional causality
(Gottlied, 2000; Laland et al., 2011). The linear G-Emodel should
give way to one of reciprocal influences that incorporates the
phenotype (van Os et al., 2010). Figure 2 shows a schema of this
model.
A NEW LEASE OF LIFE FOR THE
PSYCHOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
In the words of a patient: “People talk about chemical imbalance.
Well, [my friend] and I, [together we made] a chemical
balance” (Davidson, 2003, p. 170). However, the treatment of
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FIGURE 2 | Model of interplay between Environment (E), Genotype (G), and Phenotype (P). The environment can shape phenotypes as well as inducing
epigenetic changes. Phenotypes, that is, people’s psychotic symptoms and adaptive efforts, can build environments which in turn induce and select epigenetic
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choice for schizophrenia is so-called antipsychotic medication.
Notwithstanding the fact that it would be difficult to dispense
with it, the truth is that antipsychotic medication presents
at least three problems as the treatment of choice: (1) It is
merely symptomatic, insofar as it ignores the circumstances
that have led to the crisis. (2) The fact of starting with
medication can “mark” the destiny of the chronic patient.
Medication becomes the topic of subsequent visits—whether to
maintain it, reduce it, change it, etc., as part of a process called
“listening to the drug,” instead of to the people themselves.
(3) Medication difficult the course of authentic psychological
therapy. Thus, the goal of psychotherapy is not necessarily to
eliminate the symptoms, but rather to change the relationship
with them and develop an understanding of their meaning
(Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008a).
For a Phenomenologically-Oriented
Psychotherapy
We propose an approach of phenomenologically-oriented
psychological therapy, in whose framework other types of
therapies can be acknowledged and integrated (Pérez-Álvarez
et al., 2011). The emphasis on the phenomenological perspective
stems from the goal of attempting to reconstruct the integrity
of the self which, in accordance with the conception outlined,
would be essential for repairing the alterations that characterize
schizophrenia (Irarrázaval and Sharim, 2014; Vallina-Fernández
et al., 2014).
The condition sine qua non in the psychotherapy of
schizophrenia is a particular kind of therapeutic relation.
This interpersonal encounter would be more focused on an
understanding of the person’s altered being-in-the-world
experience than on repairing the supposed malfunctioning
of a mechanical system (Nelson et al., 2008, p. 283).
Phenomenology offers a vision that situates patient’s
disorders not in the hidden circuits of their brains, nor
in remote corners of their minds, but in the real word of
their lives with others, in the Lebenwelt, which is, after all,
the only world in which psychotherapy takes place (Fuchs,
2007).
An empathic bridge between the therapist and the patient
is at the basis of possible recovery in schizophrenia. The space
necessary for a person to emerge from the illness is opened
up by means of the person being perceived by others as more
than his or her illness (Davidson, 2003, p. 173). Stanghellini and
Lysaker (2007) have shown that this occurs in psychotherapy
sessions, when the therapist repeatedly offers a second-person
view, when one “you” addresses another “you,” as opposed to a
third-person view referring, for example, to the “illness” or to
some supposed mechanism of it, such as an underlying conflict
or a cognitive process. These authors show through vignettes
of therapeutic sessions that the “inter-subjective method” can
help people with schizophrenia to develop the first-person
perspective for themselves and the second-person perspective
when they are with others, thus opening up the way to
recovery.
Within this approach, the narrative takes on special
importance (Roe and Lysaker, 2012). The “narrative
turn” involves listening to patients and taking seriously
their experiences and “stories.” Patients’ recovery, as they
themselves report, is characterized by a renewed sense
of hope, the understanding of their own experiences,
active participation in life, the resurgence of a sense of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1650
Pérez-Álvarez et al. Rethinking Schizophrenia
personal responsibility, and the view of oneself as a person
(Riggay, 2001).
More specifically, the narrative can serve as a thread for re-
authoring lives. What is behind the symptoms is a tormented,
disconnected, disintegrated, diminished self. As one patient
says, “[S]chizophrenia is ultimately a disorder of the self, a
disturbance of one’s subjective self-experience and the external
or objective reality” (Kean, 2009, p. 1). Therapeutic narratives
make sense of psychotic experiences, explaining the “symptoms”
in the biographical context, linking affects and cognitions,
confronting life events, proposing alternatives, opening horizons,
etc. Narratives do not merely recount experience, but actually
form it, insofar as the functions of language and hermeneutics are
not only expressive, but also constitutive of one’s own experience
and personal history (Raffard et al., 2010; Stanghellini and
Rosfort, 2013).
Not Just Narrative, but Also Acceptance
and Action
Acceptance is an active attitude of understanding-based self-
distancing, not of passive resignation, vis-à-vis uncomfortable
experiences that one had hitherto tried to avoid or control, but
with the paradoxical result of exacerbating the distress in the
long term. Acceptance is important in schizophrenia in relation
to upsetting experiences, such as voices, the attempt at control of
which is often more pernicious than beneficial. As opposed to the
fruitless attempt to eliminate the voices, a better objective is to
change one’s relation with them, one strategy being acceptance
(Pérez-Álvarez et al., 2008a, 2011). Acceptance has much to
do with mindfulness, a more common application in cases of
psychosis (Abba et al., 2008).
For its part, commitment consists in reorientation toward
values significant for one’s life, despite the fact that certain
experiences persist and disturb. Commitment is acting in the
direction of values in spite of the distress caused by the
symptoms. The question is not to wait until one gets better before
going out and living, but rather to act and remake one’s life so as
to feel better, or at least, to be on the way to something, and not
just shut up inside oneself. This reorientation of self-experiences
toward values begins with the identification and clarification of
one’s own values. From the phenomenological point of view, the
reorientation of life to values, rather than to self-experiences,
may serve to reduce the hyper-reflexivity and intensified self-
awareness that characterize schizophrenia (Pérez-Álvarez et al.,
2011; Fuller, 2013; Maiese, 2016).
CONCLUSIONS: CLOSING THE CIRCLE
We have proposed seven reasons, linked together, for a
reconsideration of schizophrenia first and foremost as a disorder
of the person, not of the brain. The argumentational thread is the
role of the self, of the subject or of the person in the disturbance
for which schizophrenia is diagnosed. This thread is at the basis
of each one of the reasons discussed.
The first reason deals with the actual conception of
schizophrenia as a disorder of the experience of oneself
and of the world (ipseity), in accordance with criteria of a
phenomenologically-informed psychopathology (Fuchs, 2010;
Stanghellini, 2010). Schizophrenia being an alteration of the basic
self or center of gravity, it is understood as affecting the person
in toto and his or her way of being-in-the-world (Sass, 2014;
Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2015). The second reason refers to its
modern origin. The relevance of this reason lies not only in the
notable incidence of the disorder found after 1750 and glaring
absence before then (Torrey and Miller, 2007; López-Ibor and
López-Ibor, 2014a), but also in the substantive affinity between
the modern self and the alteration characteristic of schizophrenia
(Sass, 1992; Stanghellini J., 2004).
The third reason concerns the juvenile onset of schizophrenia,
which has a dual implication in the perspective taken here. One
is that adolescence, the period in which schizophrenia usually has
its beginnings (Harrop and Trower, 2003), is a critical time in
the formation of the self (Erikson, 1968). Thus, certain normal
characteristics of adolescence have aspects in common with
the clinical manifestations for which schizophrenia is diagnosed
(Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2011). The other implication is that
adolescence as a critical age is a historical phenomenon that
coincides with the modern origin of schizophrenia, so that it is
no coincidence that the name of the disorder avant la lettre—
hebephrenia—denoted youth (Stanghellini G., 2004). The fourth
reason, the better prognosis for schizophrenia in developing
countries compared to those of the developed world, may also
have to do with the role of modernization in the determination
and configuration of schizophrenia (Cooper and Sartorius, 1977).
The fifth reason, referring to the high incidence of
schizophrenia observed among migrants from traditional
communities such as the former colonies of the West Indies
in European cities, at the same time as calling into question
the well-rehearsed genetic and neurobiological explanation,
demands an alternative one in terms of social causes (Morgan
and Hutchinson, 2010b). Moreover, this phenomenon could be
linked in with the high incidence of schizophrenia observed in
“modern times,” in line with the content of the second reason.
The exposition of the sixth reason includes a reappraisal of the
role of genetics in schizophrenia. Without negating its possible
role, but not magnifying it either (Joseph, 2013; Ross, 2016), here
genetics is not given primacy, but rather situated in the context
of the conditions of life and of development, in accordance
with epigenetics, whereby the decisive aspect in genetic terms
is what occurs over the whole course of development. Thus,
environmental factors such as abuse as a child, disorganized
attachment or the impact of emigration, may bring about
epigenetic changes that predispose one to schizophrenia (Read
et al., 2009; Rutten and Mill, 2009). Schizophrenia may indeed be
hereditary, without being genetic (Jablonka and Raz, 2009).
The seventh reason, which closes the circle, is the possibility
of a psychotherapy of schizophrenia, without detriment to its
being complemented by drugs where necessary. The sensitivity
of schizophrenia to psychological therapy is understood in
accordance with the interpersonal context provided, a condition
for the recovery of one’s sense of self (Fuchs, 2007; Stanghellini
and Lysaker, 2007). If, as stated in our exposition of the first
reason, schizophrenia stems from a crisis of the sense of self,
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a natural recovery involves the provision of an interpersonal
context such as that of psychotherapy (Davidson, 2003). The
possibility of a psychotherapy of schizophrenia is based on
the simple but fundamental idea that people diagnosed with
schizophrenia are people, and continue to be so.
The reasons considered situate schizophrenia as a human
condition—rather that a natural one—of historical-cultural
origin and biographical nature, related to vicissitudes and
circumstances of life. In any case, the nature of schizophrenia is
and will continue to be controversial and for that very reason is
worth a proposal such as the present one, which does not lessen
the possibility of future improvements.
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